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Regional Convergence 
and Regional Policy in the 
European Union 
Carol M. Glen 
Valdosta State University 
It has long been recognized that regional disparities in 
wealth across the European Union could have negative 
implications for the process of integration , in both po-
litical and economic terms . This paper examines national 
and regional disparities in wealth across the EU , and 
across time, to determine whether or not such disparities 
are being diminished . It also examines the role played by 
EU regional policy in this regard. The paper concludes 
that while some success has been achieved at the na-
tional level , this success hides a much more heterogene-
ous mix of convergence and dispersion at the regional 
level . Despite the increased funds that have been devoted 
to EU regional policy in recent years , it is argued that 
the impact of regional policy may be more political than 
economic; regional policy promotes the ideal of cohesion 
more than the reality of economic convergence . 
INTRODUCTION 
It has long been recognized by the European Union (EU) and by scholars of integration generally, that persistent disparities in wealth across the members of the Union could have nega-
tive implications for the process of integration. The Treaty of 
Rome explicitly articulated the view that successful integration 
could only be achieved by 'mitigating the backwardness of less 
favored regions.' This opinion was strongly reaffirmed within the 
Single European Act, the Treaty on European Union, and the 
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Treaty of Amsterdam , all of which underlined the EU 's commit-
ment to social and economic cohesion. Despite good intentions 
however, regional disparities persist and could place economic 
and political barriers in the way of deeper integration. 
The existence of significant differences in prosperity across 
the Union has been blamed for undermining a number of EU 
economic goals. One of the principle objectives of the integra-
tion process is to increase European competitiveness, and 
thereby overall prosperity , by reducing the barriers to the move-
ment of both goods and factors within the EU. Such liberaliza-
tion should lead to gains in the overall level of Union welfare, 
yet persistent regional disparities in wealth can interfere with 
allocative efficiency and prevent an economy from achieving its 
optimum productive capacity . Within the EU, failure to address 
such problems as over-concentration and under-utilization of 
resources could therefore reduce productivity growth and abso-
lute gains. 
The political implications of persistent wealth disparities for 
the process of integration are equally significant. As early as 
1973, the EC Commission recognized that questions related to 
distribution and redistribution could sabotage integration at-
tempts then underway . The Thompson Report (CEC 1973) stated 
that: 
no community could maintain itself nor have any 
meaning for the peoples which belong to it so long as 
they have different standards of living and have cause 
to doubt the common will of all to help each member 
to better the conditions of its people. 
Underpinning this statement is the assumption that a link ex-
ists between the equitable distribution of the benefits from inte-
gration, and support for the process itself. Such a perspective is 
neither new nor unusual , for national governments have long 
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been aware that an uneven distribution of benefits within states 
can bring political costs regardless of whether the nation as a 
whole is increasing in prosperity. However, at the international 
level, where national pride combines with sovereignty, concerns 
regarding relative gains and losses may be all the greater. From 
this perspective, regardless of how successful the European Un-
ion is in achieving greater overall prosperity, the absolute, or 
even the relative losers in this process could threaten the cohe-
sion of the system. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine national and regional 
disparities in wealth across the European Union and across time. 
In order to do so, trends in the per capita income of member 
states is analyzed over a thirty year period, while trends in the 
per capita income of EU regions is examined over two decades.' 
Several questions are of interest: to what degree has economic 
convergence occurred among EU member states? Has the EU 
been successful in closing the wealth gap between its rich and 
poor regions? What has been the impact of EU regional policy 
with respect to economic convergence and cohesion? 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Economic Perspectives 
The branch of economic analysis that focuses on the econom-
ics of international integration is of relatively recent origin. In an 
extensive study of the theory of economic integration, Machlup 
(1977) was unable to find a single instance of its use prior to 
1942. However, when we examine the theory in terms of its 
component parts, its origins are obviously much older. Modern 
economic integration theory focuses on the process by which 
'National level data is derived from European Economy (1999); regional data is derived 
from Eurostat's Regio database. 
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separate economies are combined into larger economic regions 
through the removal of barriers to trade and by eliminating trade 
discrimination (Robson 1984). As a result, it utilizes orthodox 
theories of trade whose lineage is as old as the study of econom-
ics itself. Classical economists from Smith to Ricardo to Mill 
discussed at length the collective advantages that would accrue 
from liberalizing trade, primarily as a consequence of an interna-
tional division of labor and comparative advantage. In a similar 
vein, neoclassical economists who have built on this earlier the-
ory also emphasize the beneficial effects of free trade in terms of 
overall welfare. 
The economic reasoning for proceeding down the road to-
ward greater integration is allocative efficiency and economic 
growth. It is based on the belief that the potential level of welfare 
that can be achieved by forming an economic community is 
greater than the sum of the welfare levels available to countries 
following unilateral policies (El-Agraa 1989, 101). Orthodox 
theories of trade, customs unions and common markets are there-
fore generally unconcerned with distributional effects, focusing 
instead on absolute welfare gains for the community as a whole. 
Although neoclassical theory has largely dominated the study 
of international trade, its theoretical assumptions have not gone 
who11y uncha11enged. Faced with the reality of global economic 
inequities that appeared to be growing rather than diminishing 
(as anticipated by neoclassical theory), a number of writers de-
veloped models to attempt to explain this anomaly. Foremost 
among these works was a landmark study by Gunder Myrdal 
(1957). In contrast to neoclassical expectations, Myrdal contends 
that trade, and the movements of labor and capital, cannot by 
themselves counteract a natural tendency toward regional ineq-
uity. Rather "they are the media through which the cumulative 
process evolves-upwards in the lucky regions and downwards 
in the unlucky ones" (1957, 27). Myrdal describes this as the 
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"circular causation of a cumulative process" ( 1957, 12). Conclu-
sions drawn from this model differ substantially from conclu-
sions derived from neoclassical theory. Principally, cumulative 
causation theory postulates that the operation of market forces 
tends to increase rather than decrease inequality between rich 
and poor regions, as a consequence of their different economic 
starting points and resource endowments. The comparative ad-
vantage of rich regions lies in capital and research intensive 
products. The comparative advantage of poor countries lies in 
labor and land-intensive products. 
Similar concepts have been applied to circumstances in 
Europe (e.g. Seers, Schaffer, and Kiljunenl979; Camey, Hudson, 
and Lewis 1980). Seers and associates used a core-periphery 
metaphor to distinguish between rich and poor countries in 
Europe, when they identified an egg-shaped area near the center 
of Europe, which they called the "mega-core. "2 The EU countries 
that fall unequivocally within this core are France, Germany, 
Denmark, and the Benelux countries. Completely outside the 
core lie Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal. Seers et al. (1979) 
discovered that the mega-core is a major supplier of capital and 
technology, and is home to nearly all of Europe's transnational 
corporations, banks, and media. The periphery on the other hand, 
has an economy that retains a large agricultural sector, much of 
its local manufacturing is foreign owned, and it is more likely to 
experience outward migration. The EU Commission has also 
used this core-periphery metaphor, conceptualizing peripherality 
as being synonymous with geographic inaccessibility to eco-
nomic activity (CEC 1988). 
2Core-periphery models of development were advanced earlier by the "dependency 
schoo l" (e.g., Do s Santos 1971) to explain uneven development at the.; global level. 
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Political Perspectives 
Political scientists have also taken an interest in the effects of 
inequality on economic integration . However, unlike economists , 
they have tended to focus on the consequences rather than the 
causes of uneven development. With regards to the distribution 
of benefits obtained as a result of integration, several scholars 
have noted the potentially detrimental effects of inequity for the 
integration process. Schrnitter argues that the attainment of 
common objectives in the integration process is made more diffi-
cult by "tension-producing conditions which are caused by the 
integration process itself' (1970, 840). Two of these conditions 
that are relevant here are ' equity ' and ' envy.' The former refers 
to disagreements over perceived benefits once new productive 
and distributive forces are unleashed. The latter refers to a 
heightened sensitivity to the comparative performance of other 
members in the community, generated by higher transactions and 
available information. Similarly, others have argued that the suc-
cess of integration depends on the perceptions of costs and bene-
fits of those involved, and that these perceptions are influenced 
by both ideological factors and political expediency (Haas and 
Schmitter 1964). Nye (1971) describes the existence of such 
concerns as the 'politics of competition' and likens this aspect of 
the integration process to a zero-sum game in which the mainte-
nance of status and rank is of primary importance. 
As well as potentially aggravating competition between gov-
ernments, the persistence of regional wealth disparities could 
also threaten popular support for integration. Populations in poor 
or declining regions may be less willing to go along with a fur-
ther deepening of the process if they feel that integration has al-
ready brought them harm. This is particularly relevant when one 
considers the increasingly vocal demands of sub-national ethnic 
groups, and the growing legitimacy of territorially based initia-
tives within the EU which have together placed regionalism in 
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the ascendancy. Europe is ethnically and culturally diverse and 
these sub-national cleavages continue to have relevance for the 
integration process. As one French official put it the "reality of 
life here and throughout Europe (is that) regions are becoming 
new hubs of influence and strength" (Krause 1994, 22). Today 
most of the EU's regional authorities directly lobby in EU insti-
tutions in Brussels. 
The EU is now faced with the twin challenges of convergence 
and cohesion. Convergence refers to the harmonization of 
macro-economic indicators and is closely tied to European 
Monetary Union (EMU). Cohesion refers to the raising of living 
standards for all, and represents a social solidarity among rich 
and poor member states alike. The paradox however, is that these 
two goals may be in some ways contradictory. In order to 
achieve convergence, governments may be forced to cut back on 
measures that bolster cohesion. They may for instance, have to 
reduce subsidies or other economic transfers within their own 
borders, which is likely to aggravate existing disparities. In addi-
tion, as member states increasingly lose their autonomy as a re-
sult of EMU, they become less able to deal with regional 
imbalances. In such circumstances the role of the EU in promot-
ing cohesion becomes more important. Without some counter-
vailing measures, the goals of convergence and cohesion may 
work against one another. 
REGIONAL CONVERGENCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The economic make-up of the EU has often been described in 
dichotomous terms: as comprising a core and periphery, or as 
being overdeveloped and underdeveloped (Clout 1981 ). In light 
of the economic distinctions that can be made between EU re-
gions, these characterizations seem appropriate. The poorer pe-
ripheral regions of Europe can be distinguished across a number 
of socio-economic indicators. They are more likely to have a 
higher proportion of their workforce engaged in agriculture, to 
have a weaker industrial sector, and have more limited infra-
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structure than elsewhere in Europe. The peoples of poorer re-
gions are also more likely to have fewer of their children edu-
cated beyond high school. Poorer regions spend proportionately 
less of their GDP on research and development. Traditionally 
most of these regions have been located in Ireland, Greece, Por-
tugal, and Spain, all of which joined the EU some years after its 
inception. 
Adding these countries to the EU membership brought obvi-
ous consequences for overall levels of wealth disparity in the 
Union. Figure 1 traces the level of dispersion in per capita GDP 
found among member states during different stages of EU his-
tory. EU6 refers to the EU's original six member states. 3 EU9 
refers to EU6 plus Ireland, Denmark and the UK, which joined 
in 1973. EU 10 represents EU9 plus Greece, which joined in 
1981. EU12 includes EUlO plus Spain and Portugal that joined 
in 1985. Finally, EU 15 refers to EU 12 plus Austria, Finland and 
Sweden that joined in 1995. The most striking detail depicted by 
the graph is the enormous impact that newer member states have 
had on wealth disparities in the EU. The level of economic dis-
parity in the EU increased with virtually every expansion. Be-
tween 1972 (EU6) and 1985 (EU12) disparity levels almost 
doubled. The inclusion of Austria, Sweden, and Finland has 
helped to ameliorate this divergence only slightly. 
The graph does however indicate that some progress has been 
made. With each successive expansion overall disparity levels 
increased, but they also began to decline fairly quickly. This is 
true with all expansions regardless of the period or the countries 
involved. The decreasing dispersion rates indicate that the gap 
between richer and poorer countries is beginning to close. Inter-
estingly, during the 1990s dispersion levels increased only 
among the original six EU members. This anomaly is less sur-
prising however when one considers that this period coincided 
with German re-unification. 
3The EU6 countries are Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, and Netherlands . 
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Success at the country level can also be illustrated with refer-
ence to Table 1, which highlights changes in per capita GDP in 
the EU's four poorest member states in relation to the EU aver-
age. The case of Ireland is particularly striking, moving from 
56% of the EU average in 1973 to 108% of the EU average to-
day. This strong economic performance means that Ireland will 
TABLE 1 
Per capita GDP as Percentage of EU Average 
Ireland (1973) 
Greece (1981) 
Portugal (1985) 
Spain (1985) 
On Accession 
to the EU 
56% 
68% 
56% 
74% 
During 1999 
108% 
66% 
72% 
76% 
likely become a victim of its own success and will no longer be 
eligible for payments from the Cohesion Fund when they are 
reassessed in 2003. Two of the other three countries have also 
converged toward the EU average, although to a lesser degree. 
Perhaps most worrying is the case of Greece, which, despite be-
ing an EU member longer than either Spain or Portugal has made 
no significant progress in converging to the EU average, and in-
deed, has diverged slightly.4 
Success in reducing disparities at the national level should not 
obscure differences in wealth at the regional level. The economic 
performance of regions and countries are not synonymous; re-
gions are economic entities in their own right. As one commenta-
tor noted, "many economic processes involving capital 
4It should be remembered that in comparing national GDP to the EU average we are 
discussing only relative wealth. Greece may be improving its economic position in rela-
tion to past performance, but it is not doing so as quickly as other member states . 
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accumulation or the organization of labor operate at the sub-
national level. These regional formations ... have their own role in 
the national and international economy" (Williams 1987, 243) . 
Figure 2 illustrates how trends witnessed at the national level 
may not be translated at the regional level. In depicting the eco-
nomic performance of the EU's five least wealthy regions in com-
parison to t~e EU's five wealthiest regions, Figure 2 shows that 
the gap between rich and poor regions has widened. In 1977 the 
EU's least wealthy regions were four times poorer than its richest; 
in 1996 they were over five times poorer. This may not appear to 
be a significant increase in disparity. However, to put it another 
way, the per capita income of the five richest regions increased 
from 206% of the EU average in 1977 to 224 % of that average in 
1996. While the per capita income of the EU's five poorest regions 
barely moved from 44.5% of the EU average to 44.7% of that av-
erage. These results indicate that across the EU, regional dispari-
ties are of greater magnitude between regions than between 
countries. Moreover, although it might be expected that the poor-
est regions would be found in the poorest countries, this is clearly 
not a linear relationship. All of the wealthiest regions are not, for 
instance, found in the wealthiest country. Rather there is consider-
able overlap between member states, with each incorporating rela-
tively poorer and relatively wealthier regions. 
Figure 3 outlines the within-country regional variation in per 
capita GDP for all member states. A cursory examination of the 
results reveals that the spread of disparity within member states is 
greater for some countries than for others. Although the EU's 
wealthiest region is found in Germany, that country's poorest re-
gions are less wealthy than a majority of other regions across the 
EU, including regions in Spain and Ireland. Indeed, the German 
regions show the greatest level of dispersion ranging from a per 
capita income of 40,108 ECU in Hamburg to a per capita income 
of 12, 661 ECU in Sachsen-Anhalt. A significant spread in dispar-
ity is also seen in France, which, although incorporating one of the 
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EU's wealthiest regions, Isle de France, also incorporates re-
gions with incomes that fall below the EU average. The perform-
ance of Isle de France highlights how one region can distort the 
aggregate national figures, for it accounts for one fifth of per cap-
ita GDP in France. 
These figures demonstrate that the member state level of 
analysis hides a much more heterogeneous sub-national mix and 
as a result may reduce our understanding of the nature of wealth 
disparities in the EU. By focusing solely on member states there 
is a danger that we may not only underestimate the degree of 
disparity that exists, but also underestimate its political rele-
vance. It is entirely conceivable that in the aggregate, the mem-
ber state may be improving its economic position, while regions 
within its borders are experiencing serious decline. If these de-
clining regions coincide with ethnic or political cleavages then 
such economic difficulties could be used to strengthen separatist 
sentiment or ferment political unrest. From an economic per-
spective, persistent disparities are also undesirable for the EU in 
that they represent an inefficient use of economic resources, and 
may hinder moves toward deeper integration. 
REGIONAL POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The EU has not been blind to the existence of wealth dispari-
ties within its borders and has responded by introducing and ex-
panding upon a number of regional policy instruments. Initially, 
no provisions were made in Community treaties for a separate 
regional policy. Rather, in line with orthodox economic thinking 
at the time it was believed that the process of integration itself 
would automatically lead to convergence of social and economic 
conditions. This view was apparently reinforced by both a period 
of unprecedented economic growth following the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome, and by the fact that only one country, Italy, 
made serious representations in this regard. The EU's first ex-
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pansion in 1973 however, incorporating Ireland, Denmark, and 
the UK, brought greater economic diversity to the Community, 
along with the recognition that long term plans for economic 
integration would be strengthened if all involved had similar lev-
els of economic development. The Community's first regional 
policy was established with the introduction of the European Re-
gional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975. 
Subsequent membership expansions brought increased cover-
age of regional policy both in terms of geography and budget. At 
its inception regional funds accounted for less than 5% of the EU 
budget, this figure doubled in the following ten years . Today the 
ERDF forms part of the EU's Structural Funds, which also in-
cludes the European Social Fund, and funds related to agriculture 
and fisheries. Together these funds represent the second biggest 
item on the EU budget. In addition to the Structural Funds, the 
EU introduced the Cohesion Fund in 1993 in order to promote 
economic growth among the EU's poorest countries. The Cohe-
sion Fund differs from the Stri1ctural Funds in that its focus is on 
countries and not regions. It applies to countries with a per capita 
GDP less than 90% of the EU average; currently Ireland, Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece are eligible. 
The rationale for the introduction of the Cohesion Fund was 
both economic and political. On the economic front it was 
closely linked to the nominal convergence of national econo-
mies. In order to qualify for EMU member states had to meet a 
number of convergence criteria in terms of inflation, interest 
rates, public sector indebtedness, and monetary stability. It was 
believed that all of this would be more easily achieved with the 
establishment of an additional fund targeted at poorer countries. 
The Fund was also designed to lessen the impact of any austerity 
measures that these governments would have to introduce in or-
der to meet convergence criteria. From a political viewpoint, the 
establishment of the Cohesion Fund can also be seen as an incen-
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tive, or side-payment, awarded to recalcitrant countries to en-
courage them to concede to deeper integration.5 During negotia-
tions for the Treaty on European Union, the Spanish government 
in particular argued forcefully for the inclusion of the Cohesion 
Fund. 
· Since 1988 the Structural Funds have been focused on six 
policy objectives that address both regional and Union-wide 
problems. Almost all of the measures (90%) have been taken on 
the initiative of member states, and members must co-finance the 
programs (COR Opinion 1997). Despite claims of some success, 
reform of the Funds became necessary when existing regulations 
governing their operation expired in 1999. An even more press-
ing reason for reform is the prospect of the EU's next expansion. 
The future accession of the countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe (CCEE) will represent an unprecedented expansion of 
the EU and could place tremendous strains on regional funds. Of 
the ten CCEE the wealthiest, Slovenia, is poorer than the EU's 
current least wealthy member, Greece. Together, the per capita 
GDP of the CCEE is three times less than the EU average. 
To meet the expected additional burdens of the CCEE, the 
Union had the option of increasing required budget contributions 
from member states, or reducing the number of regions eligible 
for assistance. With little support for increasing contribution, the 
latter option was chosen. In its Agenda 2000 strategy document, 
the European Commission proposed three themes that would 
govern reform of the Structural Funds: concentration of assis-
tance, simplification, and decentralization of management. The 
result has been a greater consolidation of the Funds and a greater 
targeting toward the most needy regions. The six priority objec-
5Moravcsik (1993) goes so far as to argue that since regional policies are "neither signifi-
cant enough to provide major benefits for donors , nor widely enough distributed to repre-
sent a policy of common interest [they] are most plausibly interpreted as side payments 
extended in exchange for other policies" (p. 496) . 
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tives were collapsed into three and eligibility was tightened. A 
comparison of the old and reformed Structural Fund objectives is 
displayed in Table 2. It remains to be seen how successful these 
reforms will be in alleviating the problem of regional wealth dis-
parities, but the enormity of the problem should not be underes-
timated. 
TABLE2 
Structural Fund Objectives 
Objectives 1995-1999 Ob_jectives 2000-2006 
Objective ]: structural ad-
justment of regions lagging 
behind in development 
Objective 2: re-conversion of Objective ]: regions where 
regions in industrial c!ecline the GDP per capita is less 
than 75% of the EU average 
Objective 3 : actions to com-
bat long-term unemployment 
Objective 4: actions to pre- Objective 2: economic and 
vent unemployment social re-conversion of re-
gions that are experiencing 
structural difficulties 
Objective 5a: modernization 
of agricultural structures 
Objective 5b: economic di- Objective 3: all actions pro-
versification in rural areas moting the development of 
human resources, outside re-
gions that are eligible under 
Obiective 1 
Objective 6: development of 
scarcely populated regions 
VOL. 30 2002 
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THE IMPACT OF REGIONAL POLICY 
The impact of a single policy on an organization as large as 
the European Union is difficult to measure, but by tracing trends 
in economic convergence and economic divergence over a num-
ber of years it has been possible to assess whether the EU's goals 
in this area are currently being met. The descriptive analysis in 
this study reveals that while significant progress has been made 
by some countries in closing the economic gap between them-
selves and the EU average, this is much less evident at the re-
gional level. Data indicates that poor regions are becoming 
comparatively poorer, while rich regions are becoming compara-
tively richer. This has occurred despite substantial increases in 
the availability of EU regional funds in recent years . 
Explanations for this apparent lack of success are varied and 
can be attributed to factors both within and beyond the EU's con-
trol. 
Timing of Regional Policy Funds 
Substantial increases in regional funds were made available 
only during the late 1980s and it is likely that it would take a 
number of years before they could impact convergence . In addi-
tion, the late 1980s brought a re-orientation of regional policy 
that replaced the goal of income redistribution with that of struc-
tural adjustment. Rather than attempting to entice external indus-
tries to relocate in poor regions, the EU has increasingly sought 
strategies that would promote indigenous economic growth. 
While this strategy is designed to improve regional competitive-
ness and provide a solid basis for future growth, it is necessarily 
long term in nature. 
Size of the funds 
Although funds for regional development have increased sub-
stantially over the years they still amount to less than a half per-
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cent of EU GDP, so it is questionable just how much impact they 
can be expected to have. It could be argued that successes wit-
nessed at the national level are attributable to factors other than 
regional policy. The most successful recipient country of Cohe-
sion Funds is Ireland, which has closed the gap between itself 
and wealthier EU members significantly. However, Spain, Portu-
gal, and Greece received similar levels of funding and did not do 
so well. In fact, Portugal and Greece received more from the Co-
hesion Fund than Ireland, as a percentage of their GDP. This 
suggests that Ireland's economic success should be attributed to 
additional unique factors. Much of Ireland's recent economic 
prosperity for instance, stems from the influx of a large number 
of transnational corporations who manufacture high value-added 
products for export. The economic impact of this influx has been 
to greatly improve the Irish economy in relation to the rest of the 
EU. 
Role of the Member-States 
Member states are expected to co-finance EU regional policy 
programs within their own borders, however this is not where the 
bulk of their influence lies. EU regional policy pales in compari-
son to the myriad of instruments and incentives that are available 
to national governments to promote regional economic growth. 
Even in countries where there is no explicit system for doing so, 
regional transfers usually occur as a result of taxation and public 
expenditure systems. In general, dynamic regions pay more tax 
while less favored regions receive a disproportionate share of 
public expenditure (Begg 1997). Although not specifically 
planned, such arrangements help to minimize disparities within 
countries. Other actions taken by national governments however, 
work to offset these benefits. A recent EU study found that al-
though most regional policies introduced by national govern-
ments support cohesion, 
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the pattern of expenditures on policies aimed at im-
proving the competitiveness of national economies 
by promoting R&D (Research and Development) is 
virtually a mirror image of patterns of regional dis-
parity ; the wealthier the region is, the more the gov-
ernment tends to spend on promoting R&D within 
that region. Conversely, the poorer a region is, the 
smaller the amount spent on R&D as a proportion of 
regional GDP . (Regional Development Studies 29, 
1998) 
This finding is extremely significant when one considers the 
vital role that innovation plays in developing and sustaining re-
gional competitiveness. 
Breadth of the Problem 
When discussing regional disparities in the EU it is important 
to recognize that the causes of such disparities vary from region 
to region. In the four Cohesion countries the EU is faced with 
implementing regional policy within national economies that are 
themselves underdeveloped . This creates tensions between com-
peting priorities, promoting national prosperity or reducing re-
gional disparities. In these countries, underemployment, 
unemployment and peripherality are also central concerns. In 
central and northern Europe (Austria, Belgium , Denmark, 
France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK) regional 
problems are related to industrial decline and restructuring, often 
accompanied by problems of urban decay. Germany is character-
ized by extreme internal disparities in wealth, requiring exten-
sive national regional policies . The Nordic member states 
(Finland and Sweden) are faced with peripherality, sparsely 
populated areas, and harsh climates (Regional Development 
Studies 29, 1998). The EU of course recognizes these distinc-
tions in the different objectives laid out in the Structural Funds. 
However, given the breadth of these problems and the limited 
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resources available for regional policy, the impact of such fund-
ing must remain somewhat limited. 
EMU 
European Monetary Union could undermine regional policy 
and regional convergence. The convergence criteria established 
for entry into EMU required that some governments reduce 
spending, potentially aggravating regional wealthy disparities, 
even with the introduction of EMU such problems have not dis-
appeared. The challenges of EMU are daunting, reconciling 
competing policy demands, creating real convergence, and cop-
ing with asymmetric shocks. It is questionable whether the Struc-
tural funds will be substantial enough or flexible enough to make 
significant contributions (Begg 1997). Moreover, such chal-
lenges are unlikely to be diminished in the near future. Unlike 
member states, the EU has few powers to raise and re-distribute 
funds. Without such mechanisms the development of compre-
hensive inter-regional transfers to cope with EMU will be limited 
(Begg 1997). 
CONCLUSION 
Despite its weaknesses, none of this is an argument against 
EU involvement in regional policy. Although many policy goals 
are yet to be met, the data on national convergence indicates that 
some progress has been made. It is also likely that EU regional 
policy will become increasingly important in the near future. 
EMU reduces the ability of member states to promote regional 
convergence within their own borders; the EU can and should 
step into this void. In producing an EU-wide regional policy, the 
EU can promote economic convergence while ensuring fair 
competition among regions, consistent with the requirements of 
the single market. In this the EU can also play an important co-
ordinating role, verifying that member state regional policies are 
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consistent with overall EU goals. EU regional policy will also be 
vital if the CCEE are to be successfully integrated into the Un-
ion. By EU standards, all of these countries are poor and will 
require substantial investments be made if they are not to remain 
so. Before accession much of this investment is provided through 
the Phare Program, after accession it will be provided by the 
Structural Funds. 
To date, the impact of EU regional policy is perhaps more po-
litical than economic; regional policy is more likely to promote 
the idea of cohesion than the actuality of convergence. The value 
of cohesion if achieved however, should not be underestimated. 
It refers to a social solidarity, a belief that it is the "common will 
of all" to improve the living standards of all EU citizens no mat-
ter where they reside. Without cohesion the foundation upon 
which the EU is based will be greatly weakened. 
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